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Executive Summary 
Many existing classifications of developing countries are dominated by income per capita 
(such as the World Bank’s low, middle and high income thresholds), thus neglecting the 
multidimensionality of the concept of ‘development’. Even those deemed to be the main 
‘alternatives’ to the income-based classification have income per capita heavily weighted 
within a composite indicator. 
This paper provides an alternative perspective: clusters of developing countries. We take 
4 ‘frames’ on the meaning of development: economic development, human 
development, better governance, and environmental sustainability. We then use a cluster 
procedure in order to build groups of countries that are  to some extent  internally 
‘homogeneous’, but noticeably dissimilar to other groups. The advantage of this 
procedure is that it allows us identify the key development characteristics of each cluster 
of countries and where each country fits best. We then use this taxonomy to analyze 
how the developing world has changed since the late 1990s in terms of clusters of 
countries and the country groupings themselves. 
The main findings are as follows: First, the developing world can be classified into five 
multidimensional development clusters and this number of clusters remains the same 
between the periods 1995-2000 and 2005-2010. However, not surprisingly, the nature of 
the clusters has changed over time. The development taxonomy in the more recent 
period of 2005-2010 was as follows: 
 Cluster 1 consists of countries with high poverty rates and largely ‘traditional’ 
economies. 
 Cluster 2 is countries with high poverty rates that are primary product exporting 
and have limited political freedoms. 
 Cluster 3 is composed of countries with democratic regimes and high levels of 
inequality and dependency on external flows. 
 Cluster 4 is of “emerging economies” who are primary product exporting with 
low inequality but high environmental pollution and limited political freedom. 
 Cluster 5 is of unequal and highly polluting “emerging economies” with low 
dependence on external finance. 
The development characteristics of four of the five clusters remain similar over time, but 
cluster 2 changed dramatically. 
A third of all developing countries changed cluster membership between these two 
periods, and the remainder of the developing countries remain in the same cluster. 
We argue that these ‘dynamic’ results mean that there is no simple ‘linear’ representation 
of development levels (from low to high development countries), as is implied with the 
income per capita  ranking  classification. 
Instead, each cluster of countries has its own and specific development issues and there 
is no group of countries with the best (or worst) indicators in all the development 
dimensions we used. 
Our taxonomy seeks to offer a more nuanced understanding of the diversity of 
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Existing classifications of developing countries are – arguably – excessively dominated 
by income per capita (such as the World Bank’s low, middle and high income thresholds), 
thus neglecting the multidimensionality of the concept of ‘development’. Even those 
deemed to be ‘alternatives’ to the income-based classification – such as the Human 
Development Index (HDI) and Least Developed Countries (LDC) classifications – have 
income per capita heavily weighted. 
Not surprisingly, in one recent review of country classifications, Nielsen (2012) argues 
that the methodology behind such taxonomies lacks clarity: 
Existing taxonomies suffer from lack of clarity with regard to how they distinguish 
among country groupings. The World Bank has not explained why the threshold 
between developed and developing countries was a per capita income level of US$6,000 in 
1987 and US$12,475 in 2011. Nielsen (2012: 17). 
Additionally the subject of classification enquiry is a moving target: In the late 1990s 
most developing countries were classified by the World Bank as low income countries. 
Today most are middle income countries. Given that the World Bank country thresholds 
are only adjusted for “international inflation” in an attempt to keep their ‘real’ value 
constant (see discussion in Sumner, 2012), this means that in real terms the threshold has 
been fixed for 40 years so, and as countries grow, more and more pass this ‘fixed’ line. 
Moreover, there is now around 50 years of new data available since the World Bank’s 
income classification was originally established, and therefore there is a clear justification 
for further assessing if per capita incomes are closely related to other indicators of 
economic and social development. 
In the precursor to this current paper we proposed an alternative approach to classifying 
countries (see Tezanos and Sumner, 2013) which is based on four frames on the 
meaning of ‘development’ that have been dominant in the academic literature for some 
considerable time: structural change, human development, environment sustainability 
and improved governance. Of course there are other potential ‘frames’ that we did not 
include as we considered that they are still evolving conceptually and empirically and 
remain highly contested in measurement.1 
                                                          
1 For this reason we did not claim our taxonomy was the final word, rather an illustration of the enduring 
weakness of income per capita to capture the many dimensions of development. 
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The choice of four frames we took is somewhat similar to that of two recent papers 
(Pritchett et al., 2010; Pritchett and Kenny, 2013). Pritchett et al. (2010: 3-4) note thus: 
When people speak of the ‘development’ of societies most people refer, implicitly or 
explicitly, to a cumulative historical process whereby economies grow through enhanced 
productivity, prevailing political systems represent the aggregate preferences of citizens, 
rights and opportunities are extended to all social groups, and organizations function 
according to meritocratic standards and professional norms (thereby becoming capable 
of administering larger numbers of more complex tasks). A given society undergoes a 
four-fold transformation in its functional capacity to manage its economy, polity, society 
and public administration, becoming, in time, developed… When in everyday speech 
people say that France is ‘more developed’ than Congo, or Denmark more developed 
than Nepal, they mean, inter alia, that France has undergone more of this four-fold 
functional transformation than the Congo and Denmark than Nepal. 
Our review in Tezanos and Sumner (2013) of the academic literature of various 
development conceptions took us to a similar approach in the sense of economic, social 
and political development but with two important differences: First we added 
environmental sustainability and second we found if anything there is no such linear 
pattern in the data – as if all countries were following a similar ‘development path’ of 
income growth. 
In this follow up paper we consider again our four frames which produced five clusters 
of developing countries and develop the taxonomy further by analysing changes over 
time to the groups themselves and the counties in each group in order to answer the 
essential question: How has the developing world changed since the late 1990s? 
The value-added of this paper is not to suggest that our classification is the end in itself, 
nor to propose that it should be used by aid agencies. Rather, the intended contribution 
of the paper is to demonstrate the weakness of existing classifications given an evolving 
developing world. In order to do so, this paper builds an alternative taxonomy based on 
four ‘frames’ on development and this taxonomy is used to analyse how the developing 
world has changed – beyond income per capita – since the late 1990s in terms of clusters 
of countries and the country groupings themselves. We use a cluster procedure in order 
to build groups of countries that are – to some extent – internally ‘homogeneous’, but 
noticeable dissimilar to other groups. The advantage of this procedure is that it allows us 
identify the key development characteristics of each cluster of countries and where each 
country fits best. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses three country analytical 
classifications in common usage. Section 3 presents the theoretical basis and the 
methodology for building a multidimensional and dynamic taxonomy of countries using 
cluster analysis. Section 4 discusses the main results and compares the outcome of the 
cluster classification with other international classifications of development. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Main classifications of developing countries 
Classifying developing countries serves two important purposes: First, for analytical 
reasons, country classifications simplify a complex and diverse world into relatively 
homogeneous groups of countries that share some distinct features, thus supporting 
understanding of the most significant inter-country differences (or similarities) in 
development outcomes. Second, for operational reasons, country classifications serve a 
purpose for multilateral and bilateral aid agencies in terms of resource allocations and 
differentiated policies towards different countries. In short, a better understanding of the 
nature of differences between countries means resources and policies can be better 
tailored to suit countries’ needs and potentially support the identification of countries 
with similar development needs. 
It is not easy to classify countries according to their levels of development, to begin with 
because any definition of “development” is complex and multidimensional. Added to 
this difficulty is the fact that the socio-economic realities of the so-called “developing 
countries” are becoming more diverse and heterogeneous, which makes universally valid 
analysis even more difficult (Tezanos and Quiñones, 2012).  
Despite these difficulties, there are several international classifications of development 
that use different criteria to draw some kind of threshold that separates the “developed” 
and the “developing” countries. Five well known classifications are: the 
low/middle/high income countries as used by the World Bank; the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC)’ classifications of ‘developing countries’ and 
“fragile and conflict-affected states”; the HDI of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP); and the Least Developing Countries (LDC) of other multilateral 
agencies such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), amongst others. 
The World Bank provides, since 1978, a ranking of countries according to their 
corresponding levels of per capita income (proxied by the per capita Gross National 
Income, GNI, based on the Atlas method, largely an exchange rate conversion). 
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Although the World Bank recognizes that development is not only a matter of income, it 
believes that the per capita GNI is ‘the best single indicator of economic capacity and 
progress’ (World Bank, 2014a). Thus, the successive World Development Reports (and the 
online database, the World Development Indicators) classify countries into four income 
groups using thresholds at about $1,000, $4,000 and $12,000 per capita which are adjusted 
each year by international inflation (World Bank, 2014b). The resulting four country 
groups are called “low income countries” (LIC), “lower middle income countries” 
(LMIC), “upper middle income countries” (UMIC) and “high income countries” (HIC). 
The OECD-DAC uses the World Bank’s income classification in order to distinguish 
two groups of countries (DAC, 2014): the “developing countries” (LIC, LMIC and 
UMIC, according to the World Bank), and the “developed countries” (basically high-
income countries). The former are potential recipients of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA). Moreover, the DAC classification divides the LIC group into ‘Least 
Developed Countries’ (LDC) and ‘other low income countries’. 
One could argue that LIC and middle income countries (MIC) thresholds are worthy of 
a substantial review, particularly because they are so dated.2 The exact methodology to 
set the lines is not public but the World Bank website states that it was based on the 
relationship between income per capita and various other indicators of economic and 
social development, presumably on whatever data was available in the late 1960s. Since 
then the lines have been revised by “international inflation”, meaning the inflation rates 
of the world’s richest countries (the weighted average of the Euro Zone, Japan, the U.K. 
and the U.S.).  In short, there is now around 50 years of new data available since the 
thresholds were originally established to assess if GNI per capita is closely related to other 
indicators of economic and social development. Further, “international inflation” ought 
now to include China and other ‘emerging economies’ in its calculation. And, indeed, it 
should be considered whether the use of ‘international inflation’ rates for the world’s 
richest countries is an appropriate way to assess the income thresholds over time for the 
world’s poorer countries, which may historically have had inflation rates above the 
‘international inflation’ rate. There are also questions as to whether purchasing power 
parity (PPP) income should be used rather than exchange rate and if the thresholds 
should be fixed in real terms or linked to the world’s GNI per capita. In fact, the 
LIC/MIC threshold has been falling as a proportion of the world GNI per capita as 
Nielsen (2012) noted. 
                                                          
2 The World Bank itself has recently opened a review of the thresholds and will probably report the 
conclusions of this review by mid to late 2014. In a similar vein, the United Nations’ Development 
Cooperation Forum of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is currently reviewing the subject of 
country classifications, although no information on this debate has been made public yet. 
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The OECD-DAC also has a grouping of “fragile and conflict affected countries”. 
Initially, three separate sources presented different classification criteria of “fragile 
states” (Brookings, Carlton and the World Bank).3 The last of these, the World Bank’s 
‘Harmonised Lists of Fragile Situations’ of 34 countries (see World Bank, 2013) arguably 
has a stronger analytical basis because: 
‘Fragile Situations’ have: either a) a harmonized average CPIA [Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment] country rating of 3.2 or less, or b) the presence of a UN 
and/or regional peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past three years. 
This list includes only IDA eligible countries and non-member or inactive 
territories/countries without CPIA data. It excludes IBRD only countries for which the 
CPIA scores are not currently disclosed (World Bank, 2013: 1). 
The OECD (2010) first combined the three lists into a list of 43 countries. As noted in 
Sumner (2010), only 17 of those 43 ‘fragile states’ were common across the lists, and the 
differences in the countries listed mean that the proportion of the world’s poor in fragile 
states in 2007 ranged from 6 per cent to 25 per cent (see detailed critique of the ‘fragile 
states’ lists from Harttgen and Klasen, 2010). Then OECD (2013) revisited the OECD-
DAC category and only one list – the World Bank list of conflict/post-conflict countries 
– was merged with a further source – the Failed States Index of the U.S. think-tank, the 
Fund for Peace –, which had the effect of producing 47 countries: 
The list of countries in fragile situations used for this analysis (neither an official DAC 
list nor an official definition) […] is a compilation of two lists: the Harmonised List of 
Fragile Situations (2009; World Bank, African Development Bank, Asian Development 
Bank) and the 2009 Fund for Peace Failed States Index. (OECD, 2013: 1). 
Further, if more than a third of all developing countries fall under the OECD’s 
definition of fragile and conflict states this sets up a binary that countries are either 
“fragile” or “stable”. In reality stable countries may have fragile or conflict-affected sub-
national units (e.g. India’s Naxalite insurgency) and fragile and conflict states may have 
largely stable areas. 
The UNDP ranks countries by levels of “human development” by means of a composite 
index – the Human Development Index, HDI – that tries to capture the multidimensionality 
of the development process. The HDI was first developed by Mahbubul Haq with the 
collaboration of Amartay Sen and other leading development thinkers for the first 
                                                          
3 See respectively for Brookings and Carlton: www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx 
and www.carleton.ca/cifp 
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Human Development Report (see UNDP, 1990). Specifically, the index includes three 
dimensions of development: health, education and living standards. The HDI classifies 
countries into four relative groups of human development: very high, high, medium and 
low human development (UNDP, 2013): 
The primary critiques of the UNDP classification have been that the HDI is only a 
partial and somewhat uneven application of human development and capabilities. It does 
not incorporate a full range of the conditions of human development (such as being 
sheltered) and, although exchange entitlements are accounted for, endowments are not, 
and because ‘capabilities’ are difficult to measure, many of the components of the HDI 
are actually based on ‘functionings’ or outcomes rather than opportunities to achieve 
desirable outcomes. Further, it has been argued that the HDI shows little more than 
income per capita (due to the heavy weighting of GDP per person, which accounts for 
one third of the index) and the index components themselves correlate very closely (for 
further discussion, see Desai, 1991; McGillivray, 1991; Srinivasan, 1994). 
Finally, there is also the UN category of ‘Least Developed Countries’ (LDC), which 
utilises a complex methodology that combines human assets (including nutrition, child 
mortality, school enrolment and adult literacy), economic vulnerability (measures of the 
instability of agricultural production, population displaced by natural disasters, instability 
in exports, and the share of agriculture in GDP and exports), proxies for economic 
‘smallness’, ‘remoteness’ and GNI per capita. The main problem of the LDC category is 
that it is somewhat static. Guillaumont (2009), among others, has argued that the 
graduation criteria make it very difficult for countries to “leave” this category (even if 
they wish to). Furthermore, a third of LDC are actually MIC which somewhat 
undermines the sense of the LDC being the poorest countries across a set of dimensions 
if a third are, at least in income per capita terms, not amongst the poorest. And finally, the 
LDC category is not actually a development classification, as it groups countries in a 
binary way in which there is not criterion for identifying the “non-LDC” (they are just 
those not deemed as LDC). 
3. A multidimensional and dynamic taxonomy of 
developing countries 
3a. Revisiting the dimensions of development 
In Tezanos and Sumner (2013) we review the history of thinking about ‘development’ 
over the last 50 years, and identify four conceptual frames in the literature on the 
meaning and measurement of development. These are: i) ‘development as structural 
transformation’; ii) ‘development as human development’; iii) ‘development as 
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democratic participation and improved governance’; and iv) ‘development as 
environmental sustainability’. Other recently emerging ‘candidates’ might include 
‘subjective wellbeing’ and ‘state capabilities’ (or ‘fragilities’). We did not include these last 
two frames in our development taxonomy as we felt that both are still evolving 
conceptually and empirically and remain highly contested in meaning and measurement. 
That is not to say the indicators we chose are without contention; merely that they are 
less contentious and better conceptually established to some considerable extent, and 
have better developed international data sets. Moreover, some aspects of state fragility 
are captured by the governance and democracy measures. 
Following this review on different development conceptions we identified indicators for 
each frame. Table 1 outlines the indicators chosen.4 It is worth noting that any choice of 
indicators is arbitrary to a certain extent: the question is how arbitrary are they and to 
what extent the data is well used by other researchers. It is also important to note that 
for the exercise of constructing an international taxonomy we require indicators for 
which there are well-established data sets with good cross-country coverage. So the 
choice of indicators, to a considerable extent, is determined by what data is available that 
fits the four development conceptions for the majority of the developing countries. 
  
                                                          
4 See Appendix 1 for descriptive statistics of the data set. 
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GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PPP: Purchasing Power Parity. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. ODA: 
Official Development Assistance. 
3b. Methodology: a cluster analysis of developing countries 
Cluster analysis is a numerical technique that is suitable for classifying a sample of 
heterogeneous countries in a limited number of groups, each of which is internally 
homogeneous in terms of the similarities between the countries that comprise it.5 
Ultimately, the goal of cluster analysis is to provide classifications that are reasonably 
‘objective’ and ‘stable’ (Everitt et al., 2011): ‘objective’ in the sense that the analysis of the 
same set of countries by the same numerical methods produces similar classification; and 
‘stable’ in that the classification remains similar when new countries – or new 
characteristics describing them – are added. Nevertheless, – as we will discuss below – 
the ‘stability’ may not hold over time when countries are changing. 
                                                          
5This section draws upon Tezanos (2012) and Tezanos and Quiñones (2012), who previously used cluster 
analysis for classifying the middle income countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
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Specifically, hierarchical cluster analysis allows one to build a taxonomy of countries with 
heterogeneous levels of development in order to divide them into a number of groups so 
that: i) each country belongs to one – and only one – group; ii) all countries are 
classified; iii) countries of the same group are, to some extent, internally ‘homogeneous’; 
and iv) countries of different groups are noticeably dissimilar. The advantage of this 
procedure is that it allows one to discern the ‘association structure’ between countries, 
which – in our analysis – facilitates the identification of the key development 
characteristics of each cluster. 
Furthermore, cluster analysis deals with two intrinsic problems in the design of a 
development taxonomy. First, it facilitates the determination of the appropriate number 
of groups in which to divide the sample of countries. Second, given that each country 
has different values for the set of development indicators, cluster analysis allows a 
synthetic distribution that makes easier comparisons of the development indicators 
across countries. 
Nevertheless, cluster analysis also poses difficulties for the classification of countries. 
Nielsen (2012) points to two difficulties: first, if the values of the development indicators 
are evenly distributed across countries, the analysis is not able to distinguish groups, 
even though there may be important differences between the indicators for each 
country. However, this limitation does not affect our exercise, as the analysis clearly 
discerns the ‘association structure’ across developing countries and thus allows us to 
identify a small number of country groups. Second, Nielsen also argues that clustering 
techniques allow a large degree of freedom in choosing among alternative measures of 
distance and cluster algorithms, which in turn complicates the selection of time-invariant 
variables that can be used in periodic updates of the classification. However, this 
difficulty only applies in the case of restricting the classification over time to the same 
exact number of groups (regardless of what the cluster analysis suggests).  
We argue in this paper that, as the developing world “evolves” over time, cluster analysis 
can be useful in order to compare the development taxonomies in two different times. 
Indeed, the analysis suggests that the development characteristics across clusters change 
over time and therefore the development taxonomy ought to be up-dated regularly. In 
particular, this analysis allows us to characterize and compare the development clusters 
built in each period (not necessarily with the same number of groups and, obviously, 
neither with the same specific countries in each group), and to analyse the dynamics of 
the development process of a single country in comparative terms (that is, in terms of 
10 
the average development indicators of the “peer” countries belonging to the same 
cluster). 
In our piece of research, we conduct a hierarchical cluster analysis using the Ward’s 
method, computing the squared Euclidean distances between each element and 
standardising the variables in order to correct differences in scale.6 The analysis includes 
99 countries in the period 1995-2000, and 101 in the period 2005-2010 (of the 139 low 
and middle income countries); hence we are including in the analysis more than 95% of 
the population of the developing world.7  
Given the type of data used in this cluster analysis (11 continuous variables), three 
possible clustering algorithms are the nearest neighbour method, the furthest neighbour 
method and the Ward’s method (Everitt et al., 2011, Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011). Since 
there is no objective criterion for selecting the most appropriate method, the selection 
depends largely on the interpretability of the final results. 
In our analysis we use the method proposed by Ward (1963), in which the fusion of two 
clusters is based on the size of an error sum-of-squares criterion. The objective at each 
stage is to minimise the increase in the total within-cluster error sum of squares. In 
practical terms, the Ward’s method has been proven to be especially suitable for building 
clusters with similar sizes, when no outliers are present (Hands and Everitt, 1987; Everitt 
et al., 2011, Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011). 
Before running the cluster analysis, we examine the variables for substantial collinearity. 
The data set includes 11 variables that proxy different development dimensions so highly 
correlated variables are not surprising.8 We did not find evidence indicating substantial 
collinearity between pair of variables. 
The next stage is to decide on the number of developing country groups (i.e. the number 
of clusters to retain from the data), for each of the two analysed periods. This decision is 
                                                          
6 Regarding the standardisation method, we use the ‘range -1 to 1’ which is deemed to be preferable than 
other methods ‘in most situations’ (Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011: 247). The analysis was conducted using SPSS 
software. 
7 The two additional countries included in the later period are Serbia and Montenegro, which were not 
independent States in 2000. The countries not included in the analysis are either insular states with less than 
one million inhabitants (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, 
Mauritius, Mayotte, Palau, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu), or countries with limited statistical 
information (Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cuba, Eritrea, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Mongolia, 
Myanmar, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Uzbekistan, West Bank and Gaza, and Zimbabwe). 
8 If highly correlated variables are used for cluster analysis, specific aspects covered by these variables will be 
overrepresented in the outcome. Everitt et al. (2011) and Mooi and Sarstedt (2011) argue that absolute 
correlations above 0.9 are problematic. 
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based on three different tools: the agglomeration schedule, the dendrogram and the 
variance ratio criterion. 
The agglomeration schedule displays the clusters combined at each stage and the 
distances at which clusters merge. This schedule is used to determine the optimum 
number of country groups. By plotting these distances against the number of clusters we 
can identify a distinct break or ‘elbow’ (that is, where an additional combination of two 
clusters occurs at a greatly increased distance). The number of clusters prior to the 
merger is the most probable solution. In this way, and despite the high number of 
countries included in each of the two periods, the scree plots show a break – albeit not a 
major break – due to the increase in distance when switching from a five to a six-cluster 
solution.9 
The dendrogram graphically displays the distances at which countries (and clusters of 
countries) are joined. The dendrogram is read from left to right; vertical lines are 
countries joined together: their position indicates the distance at which the mergers take 
place10. This graph provides guidance regarding the number of groups to retain, 
suggesting that, for the two analysed periods, between a four and six-cluster solution is 
appropriate. 
Calinski and Harabasz (1974) proposed a more precise and objective method for 
determining the optimum number of clusters (Milligan and Cooper, 1985). The ‘variance 
ratio criterion’ (VRC) recommends choosing the number of clusters that maximises the 
ratio between the overall between-cluster variation and the overall within-cluster 
variation with regards to all clustering variables (that is, a good clustering yields groups 
of countries with small within-cluster variation but high between-cluster variation). In 
our case, this suggests that, for both periods, the optimum number of clusters is five.11 
Therefore, using the three procedures (distances scree plots, dendrograms and VCR) we 
take the optimum number of clusters to be five in both periods. Before comparing the 
characteristics of these five clusters over time, it is worthwhile to distinguish which 
variables are more influential in discriminating between countries. This step is 
particularly important as cluster analysis sheds light on whether the groups of countries 
are statistically distinguishable (that is, whether the clusters exhibit significantly different 
means in the development indicators). 
                                                          
9 See the scree plot in the Appendix 2. 
10 See the dendrogram plots for both periods in Appendix 3. SPSS re-scales the distances to a range of 0 to 
25. Therefore, the last merging step to a 1-cluster solution takes place at a (re-scaled) distance of 25. 
11 See the VRC in Appendix 4.  
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In order to verify if there are significant differences between clusters, we perform a one-
way ANOVA analysis to calculate the cluster centroids and compare the differences 
formally. According to this analysis, for the two analysed periods, the 11 variables 
included in the classification are statistically significant.12 The size of the F statistics 
shows the relation between the overall between-cluster variation and the overall within-
cluster variation and, therefore, it is a good indicator of the relevance of each variable for 
identifying groups of countries. According to this criterion, the variable with the greatest 
discriminating power in both periods is poverty, followed by quality of democracy and 
productivity in the period 1995-2000, and productivity and quality of democracy in the period 
2005-2010. By contrast, the variables with lowest relative importance in the classification 
are primary exports, inequality and external finance (in both periods). 
It should be mentioned that the cluster solutions of our analysis are reasonably ‘robust’. 
As recommended by Mooi and Sarstedt (2011) we verify the robustness of the cluster 
analysis by means of the following three-step check: firstly, we evaluate the stability of 
the results by using different clustering procedures, distance measures and 
standardisation methods on the same data and we test whether these yield similar 
development taxonomies. However, one should bear in mind that – as noted, among 
many others, by Everitt et al. (2011), and Mooi and Sarstedt (2011) – it is common for 
results to change even when the cluster solution is adequate, so some degree of variation 
is expected when changing the cluster procedure. Secondly, we change the order of the 
countries in our data set and re-run the analysis to check the results’ stability.13 And 
thirdly, we replace one of the development proxies, the productivity variable, with an 
alternative variable (per capita income) for the same conceptual ‘frame’ (the structural 
change ‘frame’). 
The first check shows moderate variations in the results. In particular, for the last period 
of analysis: i) changing the clustering procedure, from Ward to the single linkage (nearest 
neighbour), only affects 17 out of the 101 countries (all of them are changes to the 
nearest cluster in terms of development); ii) changing the distance measure, from square 
Euclidian distance to Chebyshev distance, only renders 14 differently classified countries; 
and iii) changing the standardisation method, from range -1 to 1 to the simple z 
standardisation, only renders 14 differently classified countries. The second check shows 
no variation in the results: changing the order of the countries in the data set (from 
alphabetical order, to an increasing order of GNI per capita) does not affect the 
classification. Finally, we check the implications of using the variable GDP per capita 
                                                          
12 See the ANOVA outputs for each period in Appendix 5. 
13 The results should not depend on the order of the data set, unless there are outliers that influence the 
results. 
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(PPP, constant 2005 dollars) instead of productivity and the results only differ in five 
countries. 
4. How has the developing world changed since the late 
1990s? 
4a. Comparison of the development clusters across time 
As noted, the cluster analysis optimally produces five clusters in each of the two analysed 
periods. The clusters are numbered from one to five in increasing order of GNI per capita 
(Atlas method) solely to make comparisons with the World Bank’s income 
classification.14 
There are important differences in the clusters’ composition over time (Table 2). 
Although the first cluster (C1) includes 31 countries in both periods, the second (C2) 
was composed of 18 countries in 1995-2000 and dropped to nine countries in 2005-
2010; the third (C3) included 18 countries in the first period, and increased to 32 in the 
last one; the forth (C4) increased over time from 11 to 15 countries; and the fifth (C5) 
dropped from 21 to 14 countries. Furthermore, the income composition within each 
cluster (according to the corresponding World Bank’s income classifications in 2000 and 
2010) has also changed, as did the total numbered of countries in each category.15 
  
                                                          
14 Appendix 6 shows the complete set of countries classified by periods, clusters, GNI per capita and 
income groups. 
15 The overall number of LICs reduced from 51 to 29, and – in return – the number of middle income 
countries (both LMIC and UMIC) increased (see bottom lines of Table 2). 
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Table 2. Time variations in the clusters composition 
  1995-2000 2005-2010 
C1 31 31 
LIC 30 25 
LMIC 1 6 
UMIC 0 0 
C2 18 9 
LIC 14 2 
LMIC 4 7 
UMIC 0 0 
C3 18 32 
LIC 5 2 
LMIC 13 20 
UMIC 0 10 
C4 11 15 
LIC 1 0 
LMIC 9 5 
UMIC 1 10 
C5 21 14 
LIC 1 0 
LMIC 8 1 
UMIC 12 13 
TOTAL 99 101 
LIC 51 29 
LMIC 35 39 
UMIC 13 33 
 
How can we classify developing countries in the late 1990s and in the current period? A 
precise interpretation of the time changes of the five clusters involves examining the 
cluster centroids (i.e. the variables’ average values of all countries in a certain cluster and 
in a certain period, see Table 3) so we can compare the average characteristics of each 
development cluster in the two analysed periods. Overall, the developing world has 
improved in terms of most of the development indicators (see last section in Table 3, 
“total”), thus reducing poverty, malnutrition and – to a more limited extent – income 
inequality; increasing the non-agriculture proportion of GDP, labour productivity and 
scientific articles production; and improving democracy. However, the overall 
dependency on primary exports and external finance has increased over time, as well as 
the CO2 per capita emissions, whereas governance has been virtually static in comparison 
with the world average (which also includes developed countries).16 
                                                          
16 It is worth noting that the WGI are designed to have a world average value of zero (across all countries 
and in each year). Thus, if the average WGI for all developing countries remains virtually static across the 
two analysed periods it means that it has not varied much in relation to the world average (which includes 
also developed countries). 
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Despite this general improvement, the development clusters have changed significantly 
over time, and differently across clusters. On the one hand, the 1995-2000 development 
taxonomy depicts the following five groups of developing countries: 
 Cluster 1 consists of very poor countries with largely ‘traditional’ 
economies – in the Dudley Seers (1963 and 1969) sense. These countries 
had the highest poverty and malnutrition headcounts, the least 
modernized economies (with the highest contribution of agriculture to 
GDP and the lowest levels of labour productivity and innovation) and 
very low governance and democracy indicators. However, the income 
inequalities were less acute than in C3 and C5 and they had the lowest 
CO2 per capita emissions. Moreover, many of these economies received 
relativity high levels of external flows (mainly ODA). 
 Cluster 2 consists of poor countries with democratic regimes but 
poor governance. These countries had moderate income inequalities 
(relative to the average for all developing countries) and the second worst 
indicators (after C1) in terms of poverty, malnutrition, non-agricultural 
GDP, productivity, innovation and CO2 per capita emissions. They also 
had low proportion of exports in primary products and received 
moderate external finance. Although they had above-average democracy 
indicators, their governance indicators were comparatively low. 
 Cluster 3 is composed of countries with democratic regimes but high 
levels of inequality and dependency on external flows. These 
countries ranked third of the clusters in terms of income poverty, 
malnutrition, non-agricultural GDP, productivity, innovation, and CO2 
per capita emissions. However, these countries had the highest levels of 
income inequality, the lowest proportion of exports in the primary sector, 
the highest external finance, the second best scores in governance 
indicators (although still below the developing world average) and the 
highest democracy indicator. 
 Cluster 4 consists of “emerging economies” that were primary 
product exporting with low inequality but high environmental 
pollution and severely constrained political freedoms. These 
countries had the second lowest poverty and malnutrition headcounts of 
the clusters, and the second highest indicators of non-agricultural GDP, 
productivity and innovation capacities. They also had a limited receipt of 
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external finance. However, they had the highest proportion of exports in 
primary products, the second worst governance indicators of the clusters, 
the worst democracy indicators and they were the second most polluting 
countries of the sample. 
 Cluster 5 consists of highly polluting and unequal emerging 
economies. These were the most polluting countries and had the second 
highest inequality, but the highest non-agricultural GDP, labour 
productivity and innovation capacities, and the lowest poverty and 
malnutrition headcounts. They also had comparatively high governance 
and democracy indicators, and limited dependency on external finance 
and primary exports. 
On the other hand, the development taxonomy in 2005-2010 was as follows: 
 C1 continues to consist of countries with high poverty rates and 
largely ‘traditional’ economies. Despite the fact that this cluster has the 
same number of countries in both periods, it is important to note that 
this cluster has experienced the highest number of movements across 
clusters. Nine countries moved from C1 to C2 between the two periods 
(Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Mauritania, Swaziland, 
Tajikistan, Vietnam and Yemen), thus moving into a cluster with better 
average values. Three C1 countries moved to C3 (Bhutan, Kenya and 
Kyrgyz Republic). 
 C2 also changed, and dramatically, over time. Indeed, all countries in C2 
are different between the two analysed periods. In the second period, C2 
groups countries with high poverty and malnutrition rates that are 
primary product exporting and have limited political freedoms. 
Therefore, although C2 includes countries with high poverty and 
traditional economies in both periods (i.e. these countries rank second, 
afterC1, in terms of poverty, malnutrition, non-agricultural GDP, 
productivity and innovation), in the 1990s it was a group of countries 
with democratic regimes but poor governance (e.g. India, Philippines, 
Senegal and Madagascar), and currently become a group of – different – 
countries that have severely constrained political freedoms and high 
dependency on natural resource exports (e.g. Angola, Chad, Republic of 
Congo and Vietnam). 
17 
 C3 remains composed of countries with democratic regimes and high 
levels of inequality and dependency on external flows. However, C3 
almost doubled its size over time (from 18 to 32 countries). In fact, the 
18 countries included in C3 in the 1990s remain in this cluster in the latter 
period, plus other 14 new countries. Cape Verde, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Lesotho and Nicaragua are, for example, members of this cluster. 
 C4  also remained similar over time –“emerging economies” who are 
primary product exporting with low inequality but high 
environmental pollution and limited political freedoms –, although 
four new primary-exporting emerging economies joined this group in 
2005-2010 (Belarus, Iran, Jordan and Venezuela). 
 Finally, C5 – unequal and highly polluting “emerging economies” 
with low dependence on external finance – did not change its main 
development features overtime, although seven countries left this cluster 
in the last period (precisely the four new members of C4 previously noted 
above, plus Macedonia, South Africa, Panama and Thailand, who joined 
C3). 
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Table 3. Development cluster centroids per period 
Development 
clusters 














1995-2000 73.39 44.02 23.80 64.63 17.54 3,057.67 2.69 16.55 -0.92 -2.42 0.33 931.61 
2005-2010 74.97 41.55 25.77 65.17 12.52 2,515.25 2.83 22.88 -0.77 3.06 0.25 614.19 
C2 
1995-2000 71.14 41.57 31.63 67.86 12.23 3,265.07 2.95 13.08 -0.50 5.11 0.39 1,065.56 
2005-2010 53.57 41.49 20.36 85.71 38.16 5,646.59 2.89 13.78 -0.95 -3.89 0.71 1,675.56 
C3 
1995-2000 33.79 48.89 9.68 80.57 12.10 8,647.01 8.76 20.68 -0.37 6.56 1.12 3,117.78 
2005-2010 24.58 44.20 9.48 85.98 11.76 9,512.29 10.49 17.91 -0.34 7.06 1.61 2,984.06 
C4 
1995-2000 22.98 36.30 8.42 84.38 25.35 11,384.78 10.39 5.75 -0.70 -5.91 3.65 4,320.91 
2005-2010 9.19 35.96 6.36 90.50 28.74 14,978.55 26.09 6.93 -0.76 -4.07 4.91 4,934.00 
C5 
1995-2000 15.22 45.51 6.74 90.66 12.60 17,171.14 30.67 6.48 0.03 6.48 4.04 6,874.29 
2005-2010 10.10 46.36 4.94 92.92 14.03 22,059.14 54.84 6.02 0.20 8.36 4.13 7,487.14 
Total 
1995-2000 47.84 43.92 17.33 75.83 15.40 8,030.62 10.63 13.33 -0.52 2.08 1.64 1,305.56 
2005-2010 38.34 42.22 14.36 81.20 17.18 9,571.20 15.93 15.79 -0.51 3.39 1.95 3,053.86 
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In short, the development characteristics of four of the five clusters remain similar over 
time, but C2 changed dramatically. A third of all developing countries (38) in the sample 
of 101 changed cluster membership between these two periods, and the remainder – the 
majority – of the developing countries remain in the same cluster (but, it should be 
borne in mind that groups, at the same time, have evolved over time). 
Moreover, this ‘dynamic’ results mean that – as noted in Tezanos and Sumner (2013) – 
there is no simple ‘linear’ representation of development levels (from low to high 
development countries), as is implied with the income per capita – ranking – classification. 
Instead, each cluster of countries has its own and specific development issues and there 
is no group of countries with the best (or worst) indicators in all the development 
dimensions. Whereas the income classification depicts a linear development process 
where all countries are assessed as if they were following a similar ‘development path’ of 
income growth – as described, for example, by Rostow’s ‘stages of growth’ –, regardless 
of other development dimensions, our taxonomy may offer a somewhat more nuanced 
understanding of the diversity of challenges of developing countries, and their evolution 
over time. 
4b. Distribution of global population and poverty across time 
The clusters classification has important implications in terms of the evolution of the 
developing world’s population distribution (Figure 1): in the late 90s, about 11 per cent 
of the developing countries’ population was concentrated in C1, 37 per cent was 
concentrated in C2 (which included some of the most populated countries of the world, 
like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh); 30 per cent in C4 (due to China), and 17 per cent 
was distributed across C3 and C5. By contrast, the population distribution changed 
sharply in the 2000s, due to the movement of India into C1 (this cluster now represents 
almost 39 per cent of developing countries population), and the increase in C3 (due to 
the incorporation of 14 new countries in this group).17 
  
                                                          
17 See Appendix 7 for detailed information on the population and poverty distribution across development 
clusters and income groups. 
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Figure 1. Population distribution across development clusters 
 
Note: India shifted location from C2 to C1. China is in C4 in both periods. 
 
If we consider the distribution of $2 poverty in our development taxonomy (Figure 2), 
we find that in the late 90s, the two  worst off development clusters (C1 an C2) 
concentrated almost two thirds of the world’s poor (specially C2, due to India, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh), another 24.5 per cent lived in C4 (due to China), and 5.5 per cent was 
scattered across C3 and C5. One decade later, almost two thirds of the world’s poor live 
in C1 (due to the incorporation of India, that accounts for a third of global poverty), 18 
per cent live in C4 (the group with overall good development indicators but bad 
governance), 13 per cent live in C3, and 5.5 per cent live in C2 and C5. In sum, the 
aggregate contribution of C1 and C2 to global poverty in both periods is larger than their 






























Figure 2. Poverty distribution across development clusters 
 
Note: India shifted location from C2 to C1. China is in C4 in both periods. 
Therefore, the two clusters with the greatest development challenges (C1 and C2) 
concentrate the majority of the world poor, which sharply contrast with the income 
classification, were the ‘poorest’ group (LIC) concentrates one fifth of the global $2 
poor. In short, our taxonomy reveals a close relation between income poverty and other 
development problems (such as low levels of productivity and innovation, weak 
governance, and high dependency on agriculture). It should also be noted that poverty is 
the variable with the greatest discriminating power in the cluster analysis – as it was 
previously tested with the ANOVA analysis – which in turns implies that countries in C1 
and C2 share the distinct feature of having high poverty headcounts (and “moderate” 
income inequalities, in comparison with the other clusters, due to the fact that the 
majority of the population live under the $2 poverty line). 
4c. Mobility in the developing world since the late 1990s 
In sum, there have been substantial changes in the developing world since the late 1990s. 
In terms of the World Bank’s classification, a number of LIC have become MIC and a 
dominant way of thinking in contemporary ODA debates has become that aid should be 



























LDC or fragile and conflict states. This is somewhat contradictory as many MIC are also 
fragile states (as noted recently by OECD, 2013), such as Nigeria and Pakistan. One 
main problem with this approach is that two-thirds of developing countries are now 
MIC and the crossing of the arbitrary income line at about $1,000 per capita does not 
necessarily mean that domestic and foreign resources will replace ODA quickly – or 
easily – if at all. 
What does our cluster approach tell us about the specific problems of countries that are 
labeled MIC and/or fragile states and/or LDCs? Table 4 considers this by building a 
“contemporary cluster and mobility matrix” that considers countries how the clusters in 
2005-2010 compare to the main international classifications and how the clusters 
compare to countries that have moved from LIC to MIC status since the late 1990s. 
Some of these are “new MIC” and others are “bounce-back MIC” in the sense that they 
were MIC in a prior period and fell back. 
Indeed, the MIC group itself is currently over 100 countries and thus has considerable 
diversity. The LMIC and UMIC groups provide something of a split at $4,000 income 
per capita level. However, within the group there are clearly other forms of differentiation: 
for example, 19 MIC are fragile states (in the OECD-DAC list). Others are ‘emerging’ 
powers – meaning G20 members – such as India and Indonesia, who have limited need 
for ODA per se but still have substantial poor populations – especially so at $1.25 and $2 
poverty lines or higher. 
There are “old” MIC and “new” MIC. Two thirds of MIC were so prior to 1990 and 
remain so today. This group contains many of the emerging powers or better off MIC 
such as Brazil. Just a third of MIC are ‘new’ MIC, meaning the country graduated from 
LIC to MIC since the end of the Cold War in 1990. This group breaks down further into 
20 emerging MIC which were low income countries prior to 1990 and attained MIC 
status by 2010, and a second group of 14 countries that were MIC prior to 1990 but 
slipped back to LIC and became MIC again by 2010. In the new MIC there are several 
small island states or very small countries, one ex-socialist country and 13 other 
developing countries (Bhutan, China, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Lao, Lesotho, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Vietnam and Zambia). In the re-emerging MIC almost half 
are ex-socialist countries. The others are developing countries and include Angola, 
Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Nicaragua, Senegal and Yemen. 
Table 4 also shows how the five clusters map against various classifications of countries 
in the contemporary period. Interestingly, C1 has some considerable similarities to the 
current LICs and LDC groupings and also the LIC fragile states. Further, the LMIC 
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spread across clusters C1, C2, C3 and C4 suggesting heterogeneity in the LMIC group, 
although most are in C3. Whilst the UMIC are spread across C3, C4 and C5 rather 
equally, suggesting very significant heterogeneity in the UMIC too. Interestingly the 
“new MIC” (since 1990) are largely in C1 and C3, whilst the “bounce-back MIC” are 
largely in C2 and C3.
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Table 4. Contemporary cluster and mobility matrix of country classifications, 2005-2010 
Classification in 2005-2010 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
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 27 4 3 0 0 
Note: 38 developing countries (of a total of 139 developing countries) are not included due to insufficient data of which the following are states with less than one million inhabitants: Antigua and 
Barbuda, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mayotte, Palau, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu, and the following are countries with limited statistical information: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cuba, Eritrea, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, 
Mongolia, Myanmar, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Uzbekistan, West Bank and Gaza, and Zimbabwe. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper has sought to address the question of just how much the developing world 
has really changed since the late 1990s. In order to do so, the paper outlines a 
multidimensional taxonomy of developing countries and analyses how groups have 
evolved over time. 
The main findings are as follows: First, the developing world can be classified into five 
multidimensional development clusters and this number of clusters remains the same 
between the periods 1995-2000 and 2005-2010. However, not surprisingly, the nature of 
the clusters has changed over time. Four clusters remain largely the same: C1 is composed 
of “countries with high poverty rates and largely traditional economies”; C3 are 
“countries with democratic regimes but high levels of inequality and dependency on 
external flows”; C4 are “emerging economies who are primary-exporting with low 
inequality but high environmental pollution and limited political freedoms”; and C5 are 
“unequal and highly polluting emerging economies with low dependence on external 
finance”. 
In terms of the specific countries in each cluster, it is in C1 – very poor countries with 
largely ‘traditional’ economies – where there has been the highest number of movement 
of countries in and out (in particular, nine countries moved out of this cluster and 
towards C2).  
Indeed, C2 has changed dramatically over time in composition of countries and 
development characteristics. Although this cluster includes countries with high poverty 
and traditional economies in both periods, it was a group of “countries with democratic 
regimes but poor governance” in the first period (e.g. India, Philippines, Senegal and 
Madagascar), and become a group of “countries that have severely constrained political 
freedoms and high dependency on natural resource exports” (such as Angola, Chad, 
Republic of Congo and Vietnam). 
C3 has changed too in terms of the number of countries in the cluster – it has doubled 
in size with all of the countries included in C3 in 1995-2000 remaining in this cluster in 
2005-2010 but joined by 14 new countries such El Salvador, Honduras, Lesotho and 
Nicaragua. Interestingly C4 emerging economies remained largely the same as did C5. 
When we compare the five clusters to contemporary classifications (2005-2010) we find 
some clear similarities between C1 countries and current LICs, LDC and LIC fragile 
states suggesting these are the countries with the most pronounced development 
problems. The UMIC spread across three clusters (C3, C4 and C5), although most are in 
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one cluster (C3). However, the LMIC spread across four clusters (C1, C2, C3 and C4) 
suggesting major heterogeneity in the LMIC group. Further, the many of those LMIC 
are “new MIC” (since 1990) and these are largely in C1 and C3, whilst the “bounce-back 
MIC” are largely in C2 and C3. 
If we return to the question of why classify developing countries, we would argue that 
the clustering approach has some particular strengths. Firstly, for analytical reasons: a 
cluster approach has the advantages of not only tracking movements of countries over 
time by cluster, but by identifying the changing development needs/problems of each 
cluster. 
Secondly, for operational reasons, such a cluster approach has the advantages of grouping 
countries by needs that international development co-operation might address. Further, 
a cluster approach can facilitate the countries of the same group collectively identifying 
specific development strategies for the group and thus the taxonomy may be useful for 
guiding South-South co-operation policies. 
Of course there are other alternative approaches to our multidimensional development 
classification that may be useful or even better for operational reasons (e.g. for aid 
agencies). In particular, it is also feasible to identify groups of countries in accordance 
with a specific development problem (and then classify solely around this problem). This 
is the case of the list of fragile states (and even the World Bank’s income classification 
which can be either deemed as a one-single-problem classification or as a very imperfect 
“proxy” of a more complex development conception). The main difference of these 
one-single-problem classifications is that they offer a partial picture of international 
development. In fact, this type of classification implies the need of building one specific 
classification for each single development challenge, and as the development process is 
complex, it means a very large number of classifications, which has an obvious cost in 
terms of complexity.  
We can further note that cluster analysis itself has four features which make it 
particularly appropriate for the purpose of producing useful development taxonomy 
within the area of Development Studies: i) The cluster analysis has the advantage of 
providing country classifications that are reasonably ‘objective’ (in the sense that the 
analysis of the same set of countries by the same numerical methods produces similar 
classification) and ‘stable’ (in that the classification remains similar when new countries, 
or new characteristics describing them, are added). ii) Cluster analysis deals with two 
intrinsic problems of the design of a development taxonomy, the determination of the 
appropriate number of groups in which to divide countries and the construction of a 
29 
synthetic distribution that makes easier comparison of the development indicators across 
countries. iii) Cluster analysis can be used to replicate the taxonomy in different periods 
in order to analyse the dynamics of the development process of each country in 
comparative terms. And finally, iv) the taxonomy does not offer a simple ‘linear’ 
representation of development levels (from low to high development countries), but 
something that better represents the reality of non-linear development process. 
However, perhaps the two greatest challenges to the cluster approach are that, firstly, the 
cluster analysis is a more complex taxonomy than other approaches (partly because it 
captures much more). It is not without reason that income-based classifications thrive – 
it is mainly because of their simplicity... even if that is misleading. And secondly, the 
cluster analysis is open to accusations – like existing classifications – relating to the 
“approximate” nature of any proxy. Whilst any choice of indicator is somewhat arbitrary, 
what we have sought to do is to base the choice on a consideration of the theoretical 
debate in identifying ‘frames’ of development and considering what indicators are 
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Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics of the data set 
    1995-2000   2005-2010 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Poverty 111 0.26 96.18 45.83 29.15 111 0.13 94.64 37.33 29.87 
Gini 110 25.34 65.97 43.37 8.32 112 18.62 66.64 41.92 7.81 
Malnutrition 124 0.72 53.35 17.17 12.71 124 0.55 45.30 14.60 11.51 
Non-agriculture GDP 131 20.35 96.87 76.97 15.15 131 40.39 98.28 82.16 13.11 
Primary exports 128 0.10 69.06 14.07 13.94 133 0.13 75.95 15.88 15.73 
Productivity 124 402.32 47,513.27 8,849.32 7,992.28 123 418.97 49,436.06 10,019.24 8,495.45 
Articles 133 0.02 68.28 10.50 14.63 134 0.04 126.00 15.63 24.82 
External finance 133 -2.02 122.17 15.81 16.61 135 -7.53 445.12 21.06 40.48 
Governance 127 -2.17 1.05 -0.52 0.64 136 -2.35 1.16 -0.49 0.63 
POLITY 114 -10.00 10.00 1.54 6.00 117 -9.00 10.00 2.92 5.85 
CO2per capita 135 0.02 9.38 1.75 2.06 136 0.02 13.51 2.10 2.50 
GNIpercapita 139 90.00 8,490.00 1,617.04 1,772.24 133 170.00 13,280.00 3,387.14 3,065.83 
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Appendix 4. Variance Ratio Criterion (VRC) 
# clusters 
1995-2000 2005-2010 
VRCk wk VRCk wk 
2 705.23 .. 650.47 .. 
3 565.49 257.69 542.11 233.52 
4 683.44 -39.67 667.26 -50.97 
5 761.71 -148.88 741.45 -127.31 
6 691.11 283.30 688.33 259.60 
7 903.80 .. 894.81 .. 
Note: VRC implies choosing the cluster with minimum w. See Mooi and Sarstedt (2011, appendix of chap. 9) 
for a practical explanation of this criterion. 
 
 
Appendix 5. ANOVA outputs of the development clusters 
1995-2000 
 Sum of squares Df. Mean square F Sig. 
Poverty 
Between 62,703.94 4 15,675.99 77.42 0.00 
Within 19,032.94 94 202.48   
Total 81,736.88 98    
Gini 
Between 1,236.10 4 309.03 5.30 0.00 
Within 5,482.14 94 58.32   
Total 6,718.24 98    
Malnutrition 
Between 9,257.28 4 2,314.32 41.15 0.00 
Within 5,287.22 94 56.25   
Total 14,544.50 98    
Non-agriculture GDP 
Between 10,862.55 4 2,715.64 20.50 0.00 
Within 12,450.58 94 132.45   
Total 23,313.13 98    
Primary exports 
Between 1,772.01 4 443.00 2.06 0.09 
Within 20,198.80 94 214.88   
Total 21,970.82 98    
Productivity 
Between 3,061,000,000.00 4 765,100,000.00 55.01 0.00 
Within 1,308,000,000.00 94 13,909,954.27   
Total 4,368,000,000.00 98    
Articles 
Between 11,511.90 4 2,877.97 21.63 0.00 
Within 12,510.06 94 133.09   
Total 24,021.96 98    
External finance 
Between 2,912.72 4 728.18 6.60 0.00 
Within 10,371.94 94 110.34   
Total 13,284.65 98    
Governance 
Between 12.11 4 3.03 14.46 0.00 
Within 19.69 94 0.21   
Total 31.80 98    
Polity 
Between 2,261.44 4 565.36 56.90 0.00 
Within 933.92 94 9.94   
Total 3,195.35 98    
CO2 per capita 
Between 251.53 4 62.88 40.04 0.00 
Within 147.64 94 1.57   













Between 73,653.18 4 18,413.30 98.39 0.00 
Within 17,965.57 96 187.14   
Total 91,618.75 100    
Gini 
Between 972.33 4 243.08 4.54 0.00 
Within 5,135.75 96 53.50   
Total 6,108.08 100    
Malnutrition 
Between 7,321.58 4 1,830.40 33.96 0.00 
Within 5,174.59 96 53.90   
Total 12,496.17 100    
Non-agriculture 
GDP 
Between 12,098.98 4 3,024.75 47.34 0.00 
Within 6,133.92 96 63.90   
Total 18,232.90 100    
Primary exports 
Between 7,714.92 4 1,928.73 11.01 0.00 
Within 16,818.07 96 175.19   
Total 24,532.99 100    
Productivity 
Between 4,304,000,000 4 1,076,000,0
00 
78.33 0.00 
Within 1,319,000,000 96 13,737,304   
Total 5,623,000,000 100    
Articles 
Between 30,536.43 4 7,634.11 20.58 0.00 
Within 35,603.23 96 370.87   
Total 66,139.66 100    
External finance 
Between 4,250.50 4 1,062.63 4.28 0.00 
Within 23,834.78 96 248.28   
Total 28,085.29 100    
Governance 
Between 12.69 4 3.17 22.77 0.00 
Within 13.37 96 0.14   
Total 26.06 100    
Polity 
Between 2,091.16 4 522.79 54.39 0.00 
Within 922.78 96 9.61   
Total 3,013.94 100    
CO2 per capita 
Between 304.75 4 76.19 25.95 0.00 
Within 281.86 96 2.94   
Total 586.61 100    
Note: see Table 1 for definitions of the variables 
  
37 
Appendix 6. Cluster membership of developing countries 














Angola 1 420 LIC 36 2 3960 LMIC 69 
Bhutan 1 720 LIC 51 3 1870 LMIC 47 
Burkina Faso 1 230 LIC 12 1 550 LIC 18 
Burundi 1 130 LIC 2 1 170 LIC 1 
Cameroon 1 630 LIC 47 2 1200 LMIC 39 
Central African Rep. 1 280 LIC 19 1 470 LIC 12 
Chad 1 180 LIC 9 2 620 LIC 21 
Comoros 1 380 LIC 31 1 750 LIC 25 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 90 LIC 1 1 180 LIC 2 
Congo, Rep. 1 560 LIC 43 2 2240 LMIC 50 
Gambia, The 1 330 LIC 27 1 450 LIC 11 
Guinea 1 400 LIC 34 1 400 LIC 8 
Guinea-Bissau 1 180 LIC 8 1 590 LIC 19 
Haiti 1 300 LIC 23 1 650 LIC 22 
Kenya 1 420 LIC 35 3 810 LIC 28 
Kyrgyz Rep. 1 280 LIC 20 3 830 LIC 29 
Lao PDR 1 280 LIC 21 1 1040 LMIC 31 
Liberia 1 140 LIC 4 1 200 LIC 3 
Malawi 1 160 LIC 6 1 330 LIC 4 
Mauritania 1 530 LIC 40 2 1000 LMIC 30 
Pakistan 1 470 LIC 39 1 1050 LMIC 32 
Rwanda 1 250 LIC 15 1 520 LIC 16 
Sierra Leone 1 150 LIC 5 1 340 LIC 5 
Swaziland 1 1600 LMIC 71 2 2930 LMIC 61 
Tajikistan 1 170 LIC 7 2 800 LIC 27 
Tanzania 1 300 LIC 24 1 540 LIC 17 
Togo 1 300 LIC 25 1 490 LIC 14 
Uganda 1 260 LIC 17 1 500 LIC 15 
Vietnam 1 390 LIC 33 2 1160 LMIC 37 
Yemen, Rep. 1 420 LIC 37 2 1170 LMIC 38 
Zambia 1 310 LIC 26 1 1070 LMIC 33 
Bangladesh 2 380 LIC 32 1 700 LIC 23 
Benin 2 370 LIC 29 1 780 LIC 26 
Cambodia 2 290 LIC 22 1 750 LIC 24 
Djibouti 2 750 LMIC 53 3 1300 LMIC 44 
Ethiopia 2 130 LIC 3 1 390 LIC 7 
Ghana 2 340 LIC 28 3 1250 LMIC 41 
India 2 430 LIC 38 1 1270 LMIC 42 
Indonesia 2 560 LIC 44 3 2500 LMIC 54 
Madagascar 2 250 LIC 16 1 430 LIC 9 
Mali 2 230 LIC 13 1 600 LIC 20 
Mozambique 2 230 LIC 14 1 440 LIC 10 
Nepal 2 220 LIC 11 1 490 LIC 13 
Niger 2 180 LIC 10 1 370 LIC 6 
Nigeria 2 270 LIC 18 1 1230 LMIC 40 
Papua New Guinea 2 620 LMIC 46 1 1300 LMIC 43 
Philippines 2 1050 LMIC 62 3 2060 LMIC 49 
Senegal 2 530 LIC 41 3 1080 LMIC 34 
Sri Lanka 2 880 LMIC 55 3 2240 LMIC 51 
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Albania 3 1170 LMIC 63 3 3960 UMIC 70 
Armenia 3 660 LIC 49 3 3200 LMIC 63 
Bolivia 3 1000 LMIC 60 3 1810 LMIC 46 
Cape Verde 3 1390 LMIC 69 3 3270 LMIC 64 
Colombia 3 2350 LMIC 83 3 5510 UMIC 83 
Dominican Rep. 3 2620 LMIC 84 3 5030 UMIC 81 
Ecuador 3 1330 LMIC 66 3 3850 UMIC 68 
El Salvador 3 2110 LMIC 81 3 3380 LMIC 65 
Georgia 3 750 LIC 54 3 2690 LMIC 55 
Guatemala 3 1730 LMIC 74 3 2740 LMIC 57 
Guyana 3 890 LMIC 56 3 2870 LMIC 60 
Honduras 3 940 LMIC 58 3 1870 LMIC 48 
Lesotho 3 530 LIC 42 3 1090 LMIC 35 
Moldova 3 370 LIC 30 3 1810 LMIC 45 
Namibia 3 1950 LMIC 79 3 4510 UMIC 76 
Nicaragua 3 730 LIC 52 3 1110 LMIC 36 
Paraguay 3 1350 LMIC 67 3 2720 LMIC 56 
Peru 3 2060 LMIC 80 3 4700 UMIC 79 
Algeria 4 1600 LMIC 72 4 4390 UMIC 75 
Azerbaijan 4 610 LIC 45 4 5330 UMIC 82 
China 4 930 LMIC 57 4 4270 UMIC 73 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 4 1440 LMIC 70 4 2420 LMIC 53 
Gabon 4 3080 UMIC 86 4 7650 UMIC 93 
Iraq 4 1000 LMIC 61 4 2340 LMIC 52 
Kazakhstan 4 1260 LMIC 64 4 7580 UMIC 92 
Morocco 4 1310 LMIC 65 4 2850 LMIC 59 
Syrian Arab Rep. 4 990 LMIC 59 4 2750 LMIC 58 
Tunisia 4 2300 LMIC 82 4 4160 UMIC 72 
Turkmenistan 4 650 LMIC 48 4 3790 LMIC 66 
Argentina 5 7460 UMIC 99 5 8620 UMIC 95 
Belarus 5 1380 LMIC 68 4 5950 UMIC 85 
Belize 5 3110 LMIC 87 5 3810 LMIC 67 
Botswana 5 3120 UMIC 88 5 6740 UMIC 88 
Brazil 5 3860 UMIC 93 5 9390 UMIC 97 
Chile 5 4840 UMIC 96 5 10120 UMIC 99 
Costa Rica 5 3710 UMIC 91 5 6810 UMIC 90 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 5 1630 LMIC 73 4 4600 UMIC 78 
Jamaica 5 3310 LMIC 89 5 4800 UMIC 80 
Jordan 5 1790 LMIC 75 4 4340 UMIC 74 
Macedonia, FYR 5 1830 LMIC 76 3 4570 UMIC 77 
Malaysia 5 3420 UMIC 90 5 7760 UMIC 94 
Mexico 5 5010 UMIC 97 5 8930 UMIC 96 
Panama 5 3730 UMIC 92 3 6970 UMIC 91 
South Africa 5 3050 UMIC 85 5 6090 UMIC 87 
Suriname 5 1930 LMIC 78 5 6000 UMIC 86 
Thailand 5 1930 LMIC 77 3 4150 UMIC 71 
Turkey 5 4170 UMIC 95 5 9890 UMIC 98 
Ukraine 5 700 LIC 50 3 3000 LMIC 62 
Uruguay 5 7100 UMIC 98 5 10230 UMIC 100 
Venezuela, RB 5 4100 UMIC 94 4 11590 UMIC 101 
Montenegro   
 
..   3 6740 UMIC 89 
Serbia   1400 ..   5 5630 UMIC 84 
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Appendix 7. Distribution of global population and poverty across development clusters and income groups 
 
Source: Compiled by authors. $2 Poverty data processed by Edward and Sumner (2013) from World Bank (2014). WGI data processed from Tezanos and Guitierrez (2014). 
* Population weighted averages 
 
